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Unhelpful
Alfred C. Yen*
Professor Jim Chen apparently cares deeply about racial harmony in
America and has strong ideas about how to achieve the utopia he
imagines. It's a pity, then, that his article Unloving' contributes so little to
honest discourse about that subject.
The backdrop for this negative reaction to Unloving is the sorry state
of race discourse (and political discourse more generally) in America
today. Race is a difficult, complicated problem, and reasonable people of
good will disagree passionately over the best ways to end racial injustice.
Ideally, those who disagree ought to engage in honest, respectful, and
open-minded dialogue in the hope of finding common ground. In this
conversation, each participant would treat the others with respect and
make a sincere effort to fairly consider all arguments being made.
Unfortunately, the dialogue I envision rarely happens in America, at
least not in public. Americans live on sound bites. Too few want to listen to
thoughts that take more than ten seconds to express. In this environment,
reasoned persuasion often fifils. Not surprisingly, those interested in
affecting public opinion have started abandoning reasoned persuasion in
favor of so-called "attack ads."2
Consider these all too familiar arguments from present day attack
politics: Pro-life advocates want to kill women who seek safe abortions by
forcing them to "back alley butchers."" Pro-choice advocates want to
murder babies. 4 Death penalty opponents coddle criminals.5 Death
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author would like to
thankJerry Kang, Avi Soifer, and Karin Yen for their helpful comments. Thanks are also owed
to Ellen Majdloch for her able research assistance and to Keith Aoki for organizing this
Colloquy.
1. Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 Iowa L Rev. 145 (1994).
2. See Tom Mashberg, Political soul-searching follows traumatic exits of democratic
statesmen, Boston Herald, Nov. 12, 1995, at 4 (analyzing link between violence and hate in
political discourse); see also Robert Reno, Did Someone Say Politics?, The Record, Aug. 24
1994, atA24 (describing "a new and pernicious form of partisanship").
3. Se, e.g., Keep Government out of Bedrooms, Montgomery Advertiser, Mar. 15, 1996,
at A1O (characterizing pro life legislation as "a death wish to the very poor, low income teen-
age girl or woman" and describing a woman as the victim of a "back alley butcher" in an
editorial from the local Planned Parenthood chapter).
4. See eg., Letter to the Editor, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 10, 1995, at B6 ("Dr. Henry
Foster, with his 39 abortions under his belt, has personally murdered more human beings
than Jeffrey Dahmer and probably as many children as Timothy McVeigh, but who gets the
positive press?"); Fredrick S. Arnold, Putting Murder Rate in Perspective, Nashville Banner,
Jan. 3, 1996, at A4 ("Is it somehow horrible if you 'drive by' and shoot an innocent child, but
a 'non-event' if you kill thousands of babies by abortion?").
5. See, &g., The Truth Test: U.S. Congress, Austin Am. Statesman, Oct. 20, 1994,
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penalty supporters are bloodthirsty savages." Affirmative action advocates
seek handouts for undeserving people at the expense of honest, innocent
citizens.7 Affirmative action opponents are all racists.s
These attack arguments share the perversely effective strategy of
persuasion through mischaracterization. Mischaracterization works because
it helps the attack advocate avoid fair debate about the issues in dispute.
Indeed, a "'properly mischaracterized" opponent becomes a distorted,
absurd caricature of her true self-a straw person whose ideas can easily be
dismissed as bizarre, dangerous, and evil. This makes it easy for the attack
advocate to claim that he or she is right. For example, most pro-choice
advocates do not want to kill babies. Many sincerely believe that human life
has not yet begun at the time abortions occur.9 Perhaps they are mistaken
in this belief, but there is a big difference between acting on a mistake and
callously murdering babies. It is difficult to win an argument about when
human life begins, but it is easy to win an argument about whether killing
babies is desirable. That is why the "attack" pro-life advocate finds it
advantageous to call pro-choice advocates baby killers.
Attack ads are troubling because they contribute almost nothing to
honest debate. They inflame passion while avoiding the truly relevant
issues, thereby damaging the frank and fair dialogue that supports
democracy. In my opinion, Professor Chen's Unloving is particularly
unhelpful because it is an attack ad with scholarly pretensions. People who
ignore attack ads obviously look elsewhere for thoughtful analyses of public
issues. Presumably, academic scholarship is one of the places to which they
look. Academics understand that knowledge and understanding emerge
when all relevant arguments are fully and fairly considered. That is why
people take scholarly writings seriously. They expect academics to be more
careful with the facts than political consultants. Perhaps those who seek
City/State section, at 6 (criticizing a political advertisement which denounced the candidate as
someone who "coddles criminals" because of opposition to the death penalty); House Rejects
Republican Bid to Revise Crime Bill, Reuters, Apr. 13, 1994 (reporting that Republicans
criticized proposed legislation for "coddling criminals" in part because the legislation allowed
death penalty appeals).
6. See, e.g., Reno, supra note 2, at A24 (describing the crime bill as containing "more
death penalties for the bloodthirsty").
7. See, e.g., David Brudnoy, Affirmative Action Must Go, Boston Herald, Mar. 8, 1995, at
25. Brudnoy writes:
If we accept the fact that affirmative action functions both to punish the
innocent and to reward the undeserving, and if we accept that merit is the one
approach to providing rewards and the like that doesn't entangle us in a spider's
web of disaster, then any supposed "reform" of affirmative action must avoid all these
disabilities,
Id.
8. See, e.g., CNN television broadcast, June 13, 1995 (discussing polarization of
affirmative action debate and noting argument that, anybody who "oppose[s] affirmative
action (is] ... racist") (transcript on file with Iowa Law Review).
9. See, e.g., Editorial, Chapel Hill Herald, Aug. 9, 1995, at 4 (arguing for a distinction
between murder and abortion).
1574
UNHELPFUL
thoughtful analysis will take Unloving seriously because a respected
academic law review published it. This would be most unfortunate, because
Unloving's mischaracterization and distortion overwhelm any contributions
it might make to debates over race issues.
Professor Chen uses Unloving to attack an intellectual movement
which he calls "racial fundamentalism."' According to Professor Chen,
racial fundamentalism "rests on racial 'classifications so directly subversive
of the principle of equality at the heart' of the American enterprise that
racial fundamentalism must be condemned as an abandonment of
multiracial parity and as an endorsement of racial purity."" These harsh
words imply that racial fundamentalism is a dangerous, racist way of
thinking. However, Professor Chen never defines racial fundamentalism
except to say that it has a single maxim: "Dark skin good, white skin
bad."12 Instead, he proceeds by analyzing specific examples of racial
fundamentalism, and it is this analysis which makes Unloving an unfair
attack on Professor Chen's intellectual opponents.
Professor Chen's primary example of racial fundamentalism is
Professor Robert S. Chang's Towards an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space.'s In this article,
Professor Chang announces an "Asian American Moment," a time when
Asian American scholars will add an Asian American voice to legal
scholarship by writing about social and legal problems that affect Asian
Americans from a distinct Asian American perspective. 4 According to
Professor Chang, this scholarship is important for two reasons. First, the
oppression of Asian Americans generally goes unnoticed and cannot be
erased until it is recognized.' Second, the oppression faced by Asian
Americans is different from oppression faced by other groups.' 6 Thus, we
enrich the understanding of oppression in America by studying the
oppression of Asian Americans. 7
Professor Chang's scholarly agenda distresses Professor Chen. 8 This
is perfectly understandable-up to a point. If Professor Chang wants to
proclaim an Asian American moment, it is fair to doubt if a diverse Asian
America shares enough in common to make the effort worthwhile.' 9 Also,
10. Chen, supra note 1, at 149 (citations omitted).
11. Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
12. Id. at 155.
13. Robert S. Chang, Towards an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1241 (1993).
14. Id. at 1245-46, 1249-50, 1265-68.
15. Id. at 1258-65.
16. Id. at 1247-50.
17. Id. at 1250.
18. Professor Chen "reflexively recoiled" when he read Towards an Asian American Legal
Scholarship. Chen, supra note 1, at 145. And, despite wanting not to address the many issues
raised in Professor Chang's article, Professor Chen just could not leave it alone. Id. at 149.
19. Id. at 154 (describing an "illusion" that Asian Americans "respond monolithically to
whatever common legacy of discrimination they share").
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if Professor Chang wants to suggest that Asian American law professors
have a duty to join this movement,20 it is fair to ask why any Asian
American professor should feel guilty about pursuing research that he or
she finds more interesting or important.
2 1
Without question, Professor Chen could have engaged Professor
Chang in an interesting and lively debate about the issues over which they
disagree. I suspect that Professor Chen could have convinced a number of
people that he is right; indeed, I do not agree with everything Professor
Chang says. However, Professor Chen lost credibility by failing to engage
Professor Chang and his ideas fairly Instead, in an effort to annihilate
(and not merely refute) Professor Chang, Professor Chen adopts the
rhetorical tools of attack politics-mischaracterization and distortion.
Consider first Professor Chen's assertion that Asian American legal
scholarship (like all "racial fundamentalism") commands all Asian
Americans to reflexively shun white culture and white people.'s Professor
Chen writes:
Dissent undermines the collective crusade for colored power,
for "it is only through solidarity that we will one day be free to
express our diversity." Meanwhile, counter-revolutionary thoughts,
especially if expressed by recalcitrant "scholars of color," must be
suppressed. Speech becomes a linguistic whip by which the lords
of racial fundamentalism drive individuals into the appropriate
racial herds. Under the prevailing state of siege, any nonwhite
who speaks, thinks, does anything defined as "white" suffers from
pitiable epidermis envy. Hence the insults "Oreo" and
"banana"-appropriately colored on the outside, but white on the
inside. Genuine diversity withers in an academic world where it is
possible to "look Black" but "think White."
The tenets of racial fundamentalism can thus be reduced to
a single maxim: Dark skin good, white skin bad.23
Like many clever attack arguments, this passage contains a grain of
truth. Professor Chang does claim that Asian American law professors have
a responsibility to study Asian American issues.24 To the extent that this
suggests a mandatory scholarly interest for all Asian American professors,
Professor Chen has a point. I don't think that all Asian American
professors have a moral responsibility to pursue Asian American issues,
although I do think that the area is very worthy of study because it is so
interesting and important. Professor Chen, however, does not restrict
himself to a fair argument about this issue. Instead, he unfairly attacks
Professor Chang as requiring all Asian Americans to think monolithically
20. Chang, supra note 13, at 1246, 1300 ("It is our responsibility to bring our forebears
back from the silence in which they have been placed. We must recognize that the early Asian
Immigrants were brave enough to raise their voices. We can do no less.").
21. Chen, supra note 1, at 146.
22. Id. at 155-56.
23. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Chang, supra note 1, at 1322).
24. Chang, supra note 13, at 1246, 1300.
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about race and to scorn whites.
The distortion which supports Professor Chen's attack becomes dear
upon reading Professor Chang's words in context. Professor Ghen quotes
Professor Chang in the following sentence: "Dissent undermines the
collective crusade for colored power, for 'it is only through solidarity that
we will one day be free to express our diversity.'"2 Professor Chen dearly
states that Professor Chang and his ilk will tolerate no dissent from other
Asian Americans because it will harm the cause of diversity.26 However,
Professor Chang never makes the claim that Professor Chen attributes to
him. Instead, Professor Chang's writing recognizes and celebrates diversity
in Asian American thinking. Consider first the entire three sentence
paragraph from which Professor Chen quotes:
Tremendous diversity exists within the category "Asian
American." And tremendous diversity exists among the
disempowered. We must remember, though, that it is only
through solidarity that we will one day be free to express our
diversity.2
Consider further this dear statement in favor of diversity:
A diversity of views exists within Asian American Legal
Scholarship. This diversity is inevitable, and it is indeed desirable
because diversity, a term not synonymous with divisiveness, serves
as a source of strength. This diversity can be seen in the different
responses of Asian Americans to oppression. Although these
responses may be in conflict, and sometimes may even become
hostile, the very existence of a discussion moves Asian American
Legal Scholarship forward.28
These words show that, contrary to Professor Chen's assertion,
Professor Chang does not want all Asian Americans to think alike. When
Professor Chang talks about solidarity, he does not mean that all Asian
Americans must dislike white people to further a cause. He simply wants
Asian American law professors to think and write about Asian American
legal issues, even if they disagree with him about the existence of
discrimination against Asian Americans. This is a position far less extreme
than the one Professor Chen belittles.
Professor Chen further demonstrates his unwillingness to fairly discuss
Professor Chang's views by linking Asian American legal scholarship to
biological determinism.29 Professor Chang describes Asian American legal
scholarship as a reaction to discrimination and oppression experienced by
Asian Americans in America30 When Asian Americans come to America,
25. Chen, supra note 1, at 155 (quoting Chang, supra note 13, at 1322).
26. Id. at 155-56.
27. Chang, supra note 13, at 1322.
28. Id. at 1315. For additional examples of Professor Chang's caution, see id. at 1245 n.7,
1247 n.13, and 1282-83 n.200.
29. Chen, supra note 1, at 159-61. Professor Chen writes, "The popular conception of
race persists in treating human ethnic difference as the product of a rigid, static biological
mechanism." Id. at 159.
30. See, eg., Chang, supra note 13, at 1251-67 ("[O]ne of the tasks of Asian American
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they have diverse perspectives as Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Cambodians,
and so on. Many other Americans, however, do not see Asian Americans as
Vietnamese, Thai, or any other Asian nationalitly. They simply see
"Asians.""' Accordingly, other Americans usually treat all Asians uniformly,
especially with regard to discrimination.32 This generally uniform
treatment means that Asian Americans who may have shared few common
experiences before coming to America share a very powerful, disturbing
experience when they get to America."' Since experience shapes human
perspectives, Asian Americans who share common experiences of
discrimination wind up having their perspectives shaped in similar ways. In
this specific, limited and important way, a common scholarly perspective
emerges.'M
From what I can tell, Professor Chen objects to Professor Chang's
Asian American legal scholarship because the posited existence of an Asian
American scholarly perspective implies that Asian Americans are somehow
distinct from other Americans."" Indeed, Professor Chang's pessimism
over the possibility of genuine racial assimilation ' suggests that this
distinction may be permanent. This disturbs Professor Chen because he is
a firm believer in the value and possibility of a single, non-hyphenated
American identity.5 7 To the extent that Professor Chang despairs of a
colorblind society, he rejects the possibility of the racial utopia that
Professor Chen envisions.
The differences between Professors Chen and Chang give Professor
Chen another opportunity to engage in fair debate with his intellectual
Scholarship is to break the silence that surrounds our oppression."); id. at 1286-1314.
31. Id. at 1245 n.7, 1312-14.
32. Professor Chang cites the well-publicized case of Vincent Chin, a Chinese man who
was beaten to death by two Detroit auto workers who wanted to extract revenge against the
Japanese. To those killers, it was enough that Vincent Chin had any Asian ancestry. For them,
Asian meantJapanese, andJapanese meant Asian. Id. at 1252-53; see also Note, Racial Violence
Against Asian Americans, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1926, 1932, 1938-39, 1941 (1993) (describing the
tendency of many to see Asian Americans as fungible).
33. Chang, supra note 13, at 1314:
Upon this realization, I begin to understand that I am not so different
from that Filipino man who did not get a job because of his accent or those Asian
Americans who do not vote because they cannot read the English-only ballots. I
begin to understand that all oppression is connected and that its roots lie in the
past.
34. Seeid. at 1314-15:
The time has come to announce once again an Asian American Moment. With
it comes an Asian American Legal Scholarship, which includes writing law review
articles, writing briefs in the civil rights context, and teaching law school courses.
Through these media, we have the opportunity to speak our oppression into
existence,
35. Chen, supra note 1, at 157-58.
36. Chang, supra note 13, at 1318-19 n.403.
37. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution as Colorblind, 44 Stan. L.
Rev. 1 (1991).
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opponent. To his credit, Professor Chen does dispute Professor Chang's
assertion that a distinct Asian American perspective arises from a shared
experience of oppression,3s and he is adamant in his belief that marriage
across racial lines will quickly erase any existing racial or ethnic differences
which presently exist.39 Unfortunately, Professor Chen does not restrict
himself to making these arguments. Instead, he again mischaracterizes
Professor Chang's beliefs as far more extreme than those expressed in
Professor Chang's article.
In particular, Professor Chen attacks both the possibility and the
permanence of Asian American perspectives by claiming that "[r]acial
fundamentalism warmly embraces a static, biologically foreordained vision
of race."40 The implications of this statement are clear. Professor Chang
and his ilk believe that a distinct Asian American perspective exists because
Asian ancestry biologically leads to a particular way of thinking.41 This
perspective is permanent because the laws of nature which govern genetic
development cannot be changed. Professor Ghen then criticizes this view
because "biologists have systematically shown that genetic differences within
racial and ethnic groups overwhelm the genetic differences between such
groups."
42
Professor Chen's argument would be powerful if it actually responded
to Professor Ghang's thoughts. Professor Chen is right to note that the
mere fact of Asian ancestry does not biologically determine a person's
thinking. However, Professor Chang never comes close to claiming that
biological destiny creates Asian American legal scholarship. As noted
earlier, he believes that human reactions to social phenomena create Asian
American perspectives, not biology.
43
Professor Chen's final tie to attack politics is his argument that "racial
fundamentalists," including Asian American scholars, would support the
overruling of Loving v. Virginia,44 the case which declared state laws
prohibiting marriage across racial lines unconstitutional.4 First, Professor
38. Chen, supra note 1, at 155 ("What I have written so far should shatter any illusion
that American immigrants from Asia respond monolithically to whatever common legacy of
discrimination they may share.").
39. See id. at 149-54. On whether this will be effective, see Natsu Saito Jenga, Uncon-
scious: The 'Just Say No" Response to Racism, 81 Iowa L Rev. 1503, 1518-19 (1996).
40. Chen, supra note 1, at 161.
41. 'Id. at 161-62 ("The allied school of multicultural particularism seeks to immerse
'children from minority backgrounds ... in a positive prideful version of their ancestral
culture' on the assumption that 'something in their blood or their race memory or their
cultural DNA defines who they are and what they may achieve.'") (quoting Diane Ravitch,
Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures, 1990 Am. Scholar 337, 340-41).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
44. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
45. Chen, supra note 1, at 167 ("Would some racialists, if forced to make a yes or no
decision, reject Loving outright? Perhaps.... The fundamentalist vision of race dictates as
much.").
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Chen creates the impression that some scholars of color actually oppose
Loving when the contrary is true. Professor Ghen writes:
What Robert Chang merely suggests, Derrick Bell articulates:
"Reservations about and opposition to mixed marriages and
sexual liaisons can be found in black... communities. It is also a
controversial subject in Asian and Hispanic communities." Buoyed
by this opposition and "the testimony of [allied] psychiatrists and
social scientists," Bell suggests that "a state might appropriately
and legally impose different standards for interracial marriages."
Not only does the creationistic instinct in racial fundamentalism
expect at a descriptive level that like will cleave to like, but it also
affirmatively prescribes the practice.46
This passage implies that black, Asian, and Hispanic racism is the
primary obstacle to racial intermarriage, and that Professor Bell supports
this result. However, Professor Chen's assertion rests on a significant
distortion of Professor Bell's writing. As an initial matter, Professor Chen's
ellipses mark the omission of four important words. The entire sentence
reads, "Reservations about and opposition to mixed marriages and sexual
liaisons can be found in black as well as white communities." 47 This
omission makes it possible for Professor Chen to suggest that Professor Bell
endorses racist behavior by people of color when Professor Bell is simply
describing behavior common to all racial groups. Additionally, Professor
Bell writes, "One would hope that more than two decades after Loving,
reservations might be limited to family-level matters and no longer
manifest themselves in discriminatory public policies." 3 It makes no sense
to interpret such a sentence as opposition to Loving v. Virginia, yet
Professor Chen does not even acknowledge this sentence in his writing.
49
Second, Professor Chen contends that racial fundamentalists have to
reject Loving because their views about race are incompatible with racial
intermarriage. Professor Chen begins this line of argument by noting that
some scholars of color oppose transracial adoption.f As Professor Chen
correctly notes, a major argument against transracial adoption is that a
nonwhite child will develop a healthier racial identity and better learn how
46. Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
47. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, § 2.1, at 65 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis
added).
48, Id.
49. For a more in depth analysis of this section of Professor Chen's writing, see Peter
Kwan, Unconvincing, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1557, 1559-61 (1996).
50. The normative desirability of transracial adoption is controversial, and I do not take a
position on the merits of the debate. For arguments on both sides of the debate, compare
Elizabeth Bartholet, Where do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in
Adoption, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1163 (1991) (supporting transracial adoption) with Ruth-Arlene
W. Howe, Redefining the Transradal Adoption Controversy, 2 Duke J. of Gender L. & Pol'y
131 (1995) (opposing transracial adoption) and Twila Perry, The Transracial Adoption
Controversyr An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 NY.U. Rev. L 8 Soc. Change 33
(1994) (opposing transracial adoption).
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to cope with racial discrimination if raised by parents of the same race.'
For better or worse, America generally resists assimilation by nonwhite
people. Nonwhite children must therefore establish healthy identities as
outsiders. Race-matching between adoptive parents and child is therefore
desirable because social conditions give race-matched parents a better
chance of being successful parents. Parents who have faced discrimination
will more likely be able to teach their children how to cope with
discrimination than parents who have not.
5 2
The arguments made by those opposed to transracial adoption may or
may not be persuasive, but their intellectual premise is clear. Race-
matching is a desirable response to social conditions that presently exist.s
Thus, it makes sense for Professor Chen to make his points by analyzing
whether the same reasoning requires the rejection of Loving. Professor
Chen, however, does not restrict himself to the analysis of desirable
responses to social conditions.54 Instead, he also suggests that his
intellectual opponents support race-matched adoptions because these
adoptions follow some "natural" biological order."" He then extends this
51. Chen, supra note 1, at 167-69.
52. See Howe, supra note 50, at 133 (noting race is considered in adoption); Perry, supra
note 50, 61-65 (arguing that African American children need African American parents to
teach them to survive in a racist society). Howe writes:
Thus, to promote and protect a child's 'best intersts,' race is an important
factor to be considered when evaluating the appropriateness of prospective adoptive
parents. Does the person have the awareness, capacity, and sensitivity to prepare the
nonwhite child to handle the challenges that will be encountered because of the
child's racial appearance?
Howe, supra note 50, at 133.
53. Howe, supra note 50, at 133.
54. In other parts of his article, Professor Chen states his apparent belief that racism is
not a serious problem in America. For example, he writes that "we Americans have achieved
the minimal, formal prerequisites for egalitarian colorblindness." Chen, supra note 1, at 150.
Similarly, he writes that "multicultural America must surely venerate the 'half-breed' survivors
who endured and eventually conquered racism." Id. at 153. However, Professor Chen does not
repeat this belief nor explicitly refer to it in his argument in favor of transracial adoption. See
id. at 168.
55. Id. at 168 ("[P]roponents of race-matching in child placement have glorified and
legitimated the primitive instinct that a child must physically resemble his or her parents.");
see also Bartholet, supra note 50, at 1172 (stating that racial matching policies reflect
"'biologsm'-the idea that what is 'natural' in the context of the biological family is what is
normal and desirable in the context of adoption"). Professor Chen provides no citation to an
opponent of transracial adoption who states that a child "must physically resemble his or her
parents." Chen, supra note 1, at 168. Instead, he offers a quote from Wagner's S!gfiied. Id. at
168 n.155. The "best" support that I have been able to find for any glorification of a
"primitive instinct" is the statement of the National Association of Black Social Workers which
asserted that black children "belong physically, psychologically and culturally" in black
families. Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and Cultural Preservation,
59 UMKG L. Rev. 487, 489 (1991) (quoting National Ass'n of Black Social Workers, Inc.,
Preserving Black Families: Research and Action Beyond the Rhetoric 31 (1986)); National
Association of Black Social Workers, Position Paper (April 1972), in Bartholet, supra note 50,
at 1180 n.29 (1991). At best, this statement faintly suggests a biological argument against
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reasoning into child custody and marriage. According to Professor Chen,
"the logic underlying race-matching in adoptions dictates awarding custody
to the darker parent" when a mixed-race couple with children divorces.-
After that, Professor Chen claims that a person of color who favors race
matching in adoption and child custody cannot in good conscience marry
outside his or her own race!' 7 If you are a person of color and marry a
white person, you run an unacceptable risk that your children (who are
not white) will be raised by whites if you pass away 8 This is unacceptable
under the principles of race-matched adoptions because nonwhite children
owe a "blood-borne cultural allegiance"9 to their nonwhite roots. In
short, a person cannot consistently support race-matched adoptions and
racial intermarriage because the former requires a biological law of destiny
which the latter violates&
Of course, the problem for Professor Chen is that no "racial
fundamentalist" actually takes the improbable logical leaps that Professor
Chen performs. Moreover, it is unfair for Professor Chen to argue that his
intellectual opponents necessarily oppose interracial marriage when it is
easy to distinguish transracial adoption from interracial marriage and
biracial families. As Professor Ruth-Arlene Howe-a clear opponent of
transracial adoption-states in her article:
[I]t is one thing for an adult to choose to enter into an
interracial or interreligious marriage or relationship, or even to
elect deliberately not to identify with one's racial or ethnic group.
Those are adult decisions. The biracial child of an intact family
has the opportunity to be connected through each parent to her
mixed heritage without any cloud of uncertainty or feelings of
abandonment so frequently a part of the adoptive experience.
The question I find most troubling is whether it is appropriate,
fair, and equitable virtually to eliminate a full range of future
choices and to create difficult obstacles for the Black child
adoptee who, as an adult, may have to cope with a social
experience and psychic incongruity similar to that described by [a
black man raised by white parents].
6 1
Professor Chen finishes his article with a stinging, but unwarranted,
rebuke. All "racial fundamentalists," including Professor Chang, are wrong
because they oppose interracial marriage. Professor Chen "def[ies] racial
fundamentalists to defend an attitude that does not suffer interracial
transracial adoption. To me, that possibility is overwhelmed by the use of the words
"psychologically and culturally."
56. Chen, supra note 1, at 169.
57. Id. at 170.
58. See id. ("In fact unless you wish to risk casting your child entirely outside your own
ethnic heritage, you simply can't marry outside your own race.").
59. See id. ("The biological offspring of an Asian American and a black will owe a blood-
borne cultural allegiance to Africa, notAsia.").
60. Id.
61. Howe, supra note 50, at 160.
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families to form."6 2 Moreover, his intellectual opponents are horrible
people for thinking as he claims they do. "[T]here can be no apology for
the losing side.... Suffocating love, marriage, and childrearing... in the
name of racial solidarity is one of the most grotesque forms of tyranny
imaginable."63
The foregoing shows how Professor Chen has built his entire article
on the kind of factual mischaracterization and distortion that typify attack
ads. His arguments are superficially persuasive because he "crushes" a
series of absurd arguments that no one makes. He demonizes those who
disagree as racist tyrants. It is easy to defeat straw arguments like
"biological destiny implies the existence of Asian American legal
scholarship," "dark skin good, white skin bad," or "interracial marriage is
wrong," especially when those arguments are made by racist tyrants. By
contrast, think how much harder it would have been for Professor Chen to
refute Professor Chang's actual contention that Asian American legal
scholarship expresses the various reactions of Asian Americans to shared
experiences of discrimination. It is genuinely unfortunate that Professor
Chen chose not to take on this task, for a careful, fair response could have
been a real contribution to the discourse about Asian American legal
scholarship and race in America.
Regrettably, Americans have come to expect Professor Chen's unfair
and deceptive style of argument from politicians. Politicians often seem
eager to mischaracterize an opponent's record if it will help win an
election. Of course, Americans have also learned that a politician who
distorts an opponent's record may fear that the opponent's record is too
good to effectively attack on its merits. Perhaps this is what has happened
in Unloving. For whatever reason, Professor Chen commits himself to
colorblindness as the route to racial equality. He proclaims with certainty
that those who disagree are very wrong. Perhaps he is right. Yet when one
considers Professor Chen's reluctance to engage opposing views fairly,
another possibility emerges. Perhaps Professor Chen believes that his
opponents are right.
62. Chen, supra note 1, at 172.
63. Id.
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